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U.S. CRITICISMS OF THE JAPANESE PATENT SYSTEM
Introduction
In times of U.S. trade deficits, criticisms against trade partners alleg-
ing trade barriers and insufficient protection of intellectual property are
commonly heard. Such criticisms often seem little more than rhetoric
intended for domestic consumption. Yet horror stories about businesses
having their technologies appropriated in foreign countries, often because
of a lack of domestic protection, seem compelling. This clash of postur-
ing and piracy is well exemplified in recent criticisms of the Japanese
patent system by U.S. businesses and government.
Collectively, these criticisms paint a picture of a Japanese patent
system that seeks not to protect inventions, but systematically to divest
foreign patent applicants of their technology and disseminate the infor-
mation throughout Japanese industry. The posturing aspect of these as-
sertions is that they are often spoken in absolute terms, without a proper
understanding of Japanese procedure or regard for legitimate differences
between the domestic goals of the systems of the two countries. The
piracy aspect is that some companies have faced real hardships in using
the Japanese system, and found their technology in jeopardy.'
How valid are the specific criticisms of the Japanese patent system?
This article attempts to answer that question. Determinations of valid
criticisms are made where possible, and light is shed on the possibilities
when no one answer can be definitive. An overview of the Japanese pat-
ent system, including a comparison with U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice practice, is the necessary starting point. From there, the article
explores the Japanese conception of their own system. This section at-
tempts to clarify the goals of the Japanese system and how they influ-
ence, and are influenced by, the structure and substance of patent
practice. After an introduction to U.S. criticisms, the article analyzes
specific aspects of the Japanese system in the context of their alleged
shortcomings. The focus of this inquiry is upon criticisms of patent pro-
cedure, rights enforcement, and the competitive uses of patents. The
goal is to gain a comprehensive, cross-cultural understanding of both the
criticisms and their targets to determine the validity of the charges.
While the validity of any criticism is necessarily a subjective determina-
tion, this article endeavors to remain as objective as possible.
I
An Overview of the Japanese Patent System
The modern-day Japanese patent system1 is adapted from the Ger-
man system. However, it has been modified "to accommodate national
1. Law No. 121 (1959), as amended [hereinafter Patent Law].
1992]
needs and desires for a simplified, low cost system which encouraged in-
novation through a very wide participation of its technical people in the
benefits of the system." 2 The resulting system differs in practice, and at
times in substance, from the United States patent system in a number of
key ways.3 From these differences, a number of criticisms have arisen in
the United States.
A. Japanese Patent Office Patent Practice
The Japanese patent system provides for both patents and utility
models.' Basically, a "[u]tility model is a name given to certain inven-
tions in the mechanical field, which are described as devices or useful
objects." 5 Utility models are directed to innovations and small inven-
tions, and have requirements that are less strict than patents and a term
of protection that is five years shorter.6 Nevertheless, the examination
procedure for obtaining a utility model approximately parallels the pro-
cedure for patents.7 This article focuses on procedures and substance as
they relate to patents. The examination process is laid out in the accom-
panying flow chart.
The first step in the procedure, filing the application, highlights im-
portant differences between the United States and Japan. The United
States is one of only two countries that utilizes a "first-to-invent" system8
2. M. Kalikow, Comparison of United States Patent and Trademark Office, European
Patent Office and Japanese Patent Office Patent Practice, 23 INDUS. PROP. 290, 291 (1984).
The result of the accommodation may go beyond just implementation issues. At least one
commentator argues that the European patent system, including the German system, actually
takes a different conceptual approach than the current Japanese system; the former is said to
be based on the concept of contractual rights arising from the system. Samson Helfgott, Cul-
tural Differences Between the US. and Japanese Patent Systems, 3 WORLD INTELL. PROP.
REP. (BNA) 269 (Dec. 1989), reprinted in 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 231, 236-37
(1990).
3. For a general comparison of the practices of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), European Patent Office (EPO), and Japanese Patent Office (JPO), see generally
Helfgott, supra note 2. For a discussion of substantive differences between the U.S. and Japa-
nese systems, see generally Donald G. Daus, Patentable Differences: Japan and the United
States, 17 IIC 463 (1986).
4. See Law No. 123 (1959) [hereinafter Utility Model Law]. This division is not unique
to Japan and can be found in the patent systems of other countries, including Germany and
Spain.
5. Views from across the Pacific: JPOS (Japanese Patent Office Society) Talks, 72 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 1025, 1027 (1990) (Kei-ichi Sugoh, Appeal Examiner in Chief,
Yasushige Hashimoto, Examiner, Yoshio Nishikawa, Examiner, Japanese Patent Office, speak-
ers) [hereinafter Views].
6. Id.; Utility Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 15(1); Patent Law, supra note 1, at art.
67(1).
7. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS IN JAPAN 3-7 (1985).
8. The priority claim is included within the inventor oath. 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1989).
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where, among other factors, the "date of invention" determines priority.9
Japan, like the European Patent Office, utilizes a "first-to-file" system:' °
priority is determined solely by the filing date.11 However, recent
amendments to the domestic priority system allow an applicant in certain
circumstances to claim the priority of an earlier-filed Japanese applica-
tion if it is incorporated in a later-filed application.1 2 The JPO also re-
quires that all applications be filed in Japanese. In contrast, the USPTO
allows the initial filing in any language, followed by a two-month period
in which to submit a verified translation.13
Technically, U.S. practice is the same as the JPO's. The USPTO
only requires constructive reduction to practice at the time of filing. This
means that the disclosure of the invention in the patent application is
sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention. 4 The
inventor need not have made the invention. In contrast, actual reduction
to practice means that the invention has been made.
In real practice it is far more common to do exactly what is done in
the JPO-filing an application that provides an enabling description of
the invention while the details of the invention are still being worked out
and later including them in the application by amendments. 5
While an application before the USPTO is automatically examined,
the JPO requires that the applicant request examination.16 This request
may be made at any time within seven years of the filing date. " If no
request is made within this time, the application is deemed withdrawn. 8
9. Thus, if patent applications for the same invention are filed by different parties, prior-
ity is given not to the first party who filed, but to the party who can prove it was the first to
invent the subject of the application. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1989).
10. Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 39.
11. Id. Note that if the filings are simultaneous, the applicant who may continue with the
process is determined by the parties themselves. If no agreement is reached, no party may
obtain the patent. Id. at art. 39(2).
12. Id. at arts. 42, 43(1), 43(4), 44(2) (1985 amendments); Hidetaka Sekine & John
Kakinuki, Recent Developments in Japanese Patent Law, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 235
(1989).
13. Ken Hattori, Esq., member of the Japanese and U.S. Patent Bars, Presentation to the
Japanese Patent Study Group (Dec. 10, 1990).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1989).
15. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 236; Presentation of Kazuhiko Yoshimura, Ex-
aminer, Japanese Patent Office, to the Japanese Patent Study Group (Nov. 15, 1990) (memo-
randa on file with author). However, such amendments may "unjustly" impinge on third
parties who filed applications prior to the amendments and now face potential conflicting
claims. Id.
16. Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 48-2.
17. Id. at art. 48-3. The EPO similarly requires that the exam be requested; however, it
must be done within six months "after publication of Search Report is mentioned in European
Patent Bulletin." Kalikow, supra note 2, at 294.
18. Views, supra note 5, at 1030.
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The United States emphasizes secrecy of applications, publishing the
patent in the official gazette only after it has been granted. 9 However,
the JPO employs the KOKAI system in which "[a]ll patented applica-
tions are published in the patent gazette [KOKAI KOHO] describing the
content of applications [including English abstracts] 18 months after fil-
ing date ... whether a request for examination has been filed or not."'2
Considered "laying-open" the application, the KOKAI publication is
"deemed prior art to later filed applications in judging novelty [but not
inventive step], even though the application was not laid open yet at the
time when these applications filed.. ,,2' A non-filing party who com-
mercially works the invention after this time may be required to compen-
sate the applicant.22
Upon request, the examination is begun. Novelty, inventive step,
and industrial applicability-the latter two counterparts to the U.S. re-
quirements of non-obviousness and utility, respectively-are examined.23
An expedited examination24 is provided for in cases in which a party
"other than the applicant is working the invention as a business after
laying open, but before the 2nd publication," provided that certain condi-
tions are met.2 5 However, such petitions are rarely granted. In contrast,
the USPTO and EPO usually grant such requests in response to serious
allegations of infringement.26 Recently, the JPO has responded to U.S.
and European criticisms concerning this reluctance to expedite examina-
tion by introducing, on an experimental basis, separate procedures for
"accelerated examinations" and "accelerated trials."' 2 7
During the examination, there are specified times to amend the ap-
plication. Amendments must be "restricted to the scope of what is men-
tioned in the specification, claims, and drawings of the original
application document. '21 In general, amendment opportunities are
19. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1989) (confidential status of applications).
20. Views, supra note 5, at 1028; Japanese Patent Office materials provided by Kazuhiko
Yoshimura, supra note 15, at 1 [hereinafter JPO Materials].
On April 12, 1988, the United States and Japan concluded an agreement permitting in-
ventions covered by Department of Defense secrecy orders to be exempt from such laying
open, as well as publication, until the secrecy order is lifted. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note
12, at 238.
21. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 2; Patent Law art. 29-2.
22. Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 65-3.
23. Views, supra note 5, at 1030. Patentability and unity of invention standards are con-
sidered almost the same as those of the USPTO. Id.; see also Kalikow, supra note 2, at 297-98.
24. Patent Law art. 48-6.
25. Kalikow, supra note 2, at 295.
26. Id.
27. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 236.
28. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 3; Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 41.
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much more circumscribed than under USPTO practice.29 The scope of
oral communication between applicant and examiner is also more re-
stricted than in either the USPTO or EPO.3 °
If and when there is no reason to refuse the application, the
KOKOKU system is employed. The application is published for opposi-
tion in the Patent Gazette KOKOKU KOHO.3' This does not mean
that the application is granted. Nevertheless,
[a]s a result of this examined publication, a provisional exclusive right
almost equivalent to a patent right is conferred. In other words, the
applicant has not only the injunction right but also the right for com-
pensation for damages against infringement. However, where the ap-
plicant has exercised the right and afterward the patent application has
been abandoned, withdrawn or invalidated ... the applicant shall be
liable to indemnify any damage caused to another party by the exercise
of that right.32
The pre-grant opposition is a major difference from the U.S. patent
system.33 For three months following the KOKOKU publication, any
person may file an opposition to the granting of the patent. 34  "The
grounds and evidence for oppositions may be supplemented within 30
days (plus 60 days for those residing in foreign countries) from the statu-
tory period for filing oppositions. ' 31 The examiner will make a decision
whether to grant an application only after ruling on all oppositions, if
any are lodged.
If the application is denied, ex parte appeals operate similarly to the
USPTO practice, although deadlines are usually shorter and the average
total time of appeal is substantially longer.36 There are five kinds of ap-
peal in Japan: (1) appeal of an examiner's decision of refusal, including
amendments leading to reconsideration; (2) appeal of a ruling to decline
amendment; (3) appeal for invalidation of patents, similar to the U.S.
court action; (4) appeal for correction, "almost equivalent to the reissue
application system in the U.S."; and (5) appeal for invalidation of correc-
tion.37 Final appeals may be made to the Tokyo High Court and, there-
29. Kalikow, supra note 2, at 294-95; Hattori, supra note 13.
30. Kalikow, supra note 2, at 295.
31. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 2; JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, supra note 7, at 5.
32. Views, supra note 5, at 1031.
33. The EPO also has opposition provisions. See generally Kalikow, supra note 2, at 296.
34. Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 55(1) (amended to extend period from two to three
months, effective Jan. 1, 1988).
35. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 2; Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 56.
36. Kalikow, supra note 2, at 296; Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 52.
37. Views, supra note 5, at 1031-33. Previously, a trial for invalidation of a patent on
grounds that it lacked novelty or that it was obvious, as evidenced by prior art, was restricted
to the first five years after patent registration. A recent amendment has abolished this re-
stricted term. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 237; Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 124.
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after, to the Supreme Court. 3 8 However, "it is ultimately the patent
examiner who determines validity, not the court," because, even if re-
versed, he decides validity on remand.39
Once granted, the patent's duration is the shorter of fifteen years
from the date of publication (in KOKOKU) or twenty years from the
date of filing." Recent amendments, however, have provided for a lim-
ited extension of the term. Similar to provisions in the U.S. Patent Act,4"
the Japanese systems provides that "[e]ffective 1 January 1988, if it was
not possible to work the patented invention for two years or more due to
a need to obtain approvals, etc., provided in laws related to ensuring
safety, the patentee may apply for an extension of [the patent term]."4 2
The extension may be between two and five years.4 3
Substantively, the scope and breadth of claims, deemed acceptable
in Japan and the multi-claim system have differed critically from that in
both the U.S. and Europe. "Until recently, as a general rule Japanese
patent applications could claim only one invention."4 Further, the
"[s]everal narrowly drafted exceptions exist[ing] for multiple inventions
having a common basic technical idea ... were construed as requiring
essential identity between the invention first claimed ... and the other
inventions."4 As for scope, a 1984 report to the American Patent Law
Association Committee on International and Foreign Law found:
[In applications before the USPTO and EPO,] [g]eneric claims with
broad language ("means" plus function) and with a scope limited only
by prior art are normally allowed even if based upon only a single fully
disclosed embodiment, in mechanical/electrical cases, and a represen-
tative range of examples in chemical cases; specific claims based upon
construction/features/examples disclosed are also allowed[.] [On the
other hand, before the JPO,] [gleneric claims with broad language
38. Views, supra note 5, at 1033.
39. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 235.
40. Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 67(1).
41. 35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 155A, 156 (1989) (Patent term extension for certain patentable mat-
ter is subject to F.D.A. regulation that significantly delays the applicant's ability to commer-
cially utilize the subject of the patent. The prime example is the extension of the term for a
new drug.).
42. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 238; Patent Law art. 67(3).
43. Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 67-2(1)(iii).
44. "Like a legal description of real property, each claim of a patent describes the bounda-
ries of the patent owner's property." PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK
AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 452 (3d ed. 1990). Compare this with the specification.
"The language of the specification is the dictionary, or exegesis, for the claims. Both drawings
and specification must clearly support the claim." Id.
45. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 237. In other words, each application could
have only one independent claim, whereas the USPTO and EPO allowed multiple independent
claims. Dependent claims merely detailed specific elements of the single independent claim
and were not subject to separate enforcement. Kalikow, supra note 2, at 297.
46. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 237.
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("means" plus function) [are] rarely allowed; examiners prefer specific
claims based upon particular construction and features of embodi-
ments disclosed in mechanical cases or particular examples set forth in
chemical cases[.]4
In fact, Article 36(5) of the Japanese Patent Law required that claims
contain "only the indispensable constituent features of the invention," or
risk invalidation for containing old or dispensable elements.48
"Effective 1 January 1988, the requirements for joining multiple
claims were substantially relaxed."49 No longer are multiple claims
merely exceptions to a "one invention rule"; instead, they are require-
ments for joining other inventions with the "specified invention."'5 0 In
addition, joint inventions are no longer required to share whole or essen-
tial parts of indispensable features of the specified invention. Rather, the
joint and specified inventions need share only: "(1) industrial applicabil-
ity and the problem to be solved; or (2) industrial applicability and essen-
tial parts of the features indispensable to the constitution of the
invention."51 Given the prevalence of literal statutory interpretation,
this should send a clear message of greater acceptance of multiple
claims. 52
B. A Comparison of Relevant Statistics
The sheer number of patent and utility model applications received
each year by the JPO is staggering. Increasing at a rate of 20,000 appli-
cations per year until 1987, the combined applications for the years 1987-
89 were 542,709, 511,073, and 504,509, respectively.53 Focusing just on
patent applications, there were 339,399 in 198854 and 357,464 in 1989. 
5
By comparison, the USPTO received 161,660 applications in 1989.56
Given the need to request examination and the length of examina-
tion process in the JPO, it is not easy to determine accurately the aggre-
gate progression of a given year's applications. With that caveat, in 1988
there were 100,111 requests for patent examinations. The JPO granted
47. Kalikow, supra note 2, at 298.
48. Daus, supra note 3, at 478.
49. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 238; Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 37.
50. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 238; Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 37.
51. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 238; Patent Law, supra note 1, at arts. 37(i), (ii).
52. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 238.
53. Approved Minutes, U.S. Bar/JPO Liaison Council Meeting with JPO Representa-
tives, Westin Hotel, Chicago, Ill. (Aug. 6, 1990) (Attachment IV, materials supplied by the
Japanese Patent Office) [hereinafter Approved Minutes].
54. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 7; see also Views, supra note 5, at 1027.
55. Industrial Property Statistics for 1989 (Publication A), 29 INDUS. PROP., Annex, Table
1, at 4 (1990).
56. Id. at 7.
57. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 7.
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50,542 applications and refused 44,073.18 In 1989, the JPO granted
63,301 patents, while the U.S. granted 95,539.59 While that yields a
grant/application ratio of 17.7% in Japan and 59.1% in the United
States, the grant/examination requests ratio for Japan, using 1988 data,
is actually 50.5%.60
The number of applications becomes even more pronounced when
one factors in the number of patent examiners. For 1989, the "number of
[JPO] examiners and appeal examiners in patent, utility model, and de-
sign sectors [was] about 1,200 ... .,,61 Focusing on just the patent sector,
the numbers are approximately 800 active examiners, and 260 appeal ex-
aminers.62 In comparison, the USPTO employs 1,800 patent examiners.
Thus, each examiner in the USPTO faces a quota of roughly 150 applica-
tions, while examiners in the JPO face a quota of roughly 400
applications. 63
An interesting comparison is the growth of private research and de-
velopment spending in Japan to the increase in patent applications. Data
from 1987 show an upwardly-sloping curve for such spending that ap-
proximately parallels the curve for increased applications."M Finally, a
comparison of the ratio of government and private sector research and
development expenditures to the number of patents granted, again using
1987 data, is $221,000 for Japan and $1,710,000 for the United States. 65
II
Japanese Conceptions of the Japanese Patent System
It is important to understand that the goal of the Japanese patent
system differs fundamentally from that of the United States. In general,
58. Id. The number of applications granted plus the number of applications refused does
not equal the number of examinations requested because the decision to grant or refuse an
application may not occur in the same year as the examination request.
59. Industrial Property Statistics for 1989 (Publication A), supra note 55, at 4, 7.
60. However, given the narrow scope of Japanese patent applications, see supra text ac-
companying notes 44-52 and see infra text accompanying notes 79-82, the rejection rate in the
United States may differ substantively from the rejection rate in Japan. For example, a U.S.
application can be denied as to some claims, and granted as to those claims remaining.
Yoshimura, supra note 15.
61. Views, supra note 5, at 1041.
62. Yoshimura, supra note 15.
63. Hattori, supra note 13.
64. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 6.
65. Professor John Barton computed the ratio of national research and development ex-
penditures to patent grants using government statistics of R&D as a percentage of GNP, ob-
tained from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 585 (110th ed. 1990); JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 6; and statistics of patent
grants, Industrial Property Statistics for 1989 (Publication A), supra note 55, at 4, 7.
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the U.S. legal system concentrates upon individual rights.66 The patent
system is similarly focused, its goal to protect the inventions and discov-
eries of individuals.67 The individual ultimately controls the disclosure of
his or her inventions, with the incentive for disclosure coming from the
granting of broad exclusive rights.65
The Japanese legal system, on the other hand, developed without the
concept of individual rights.69  Faced with historical pressures from
larger Western powers, the Japanese came to believe it necessary that
their legal system promote the survival of the Japanese nation and society
as a whole.70 Thus, the goal of the patent system became to share scien-
tific and technical information, to teach about new innovations, and to
promote the development of Japanese industry.71 Given this goal, one
practitioner has expressed the view that Japan probably could not "af-
ford" a system that promotes protection of individual rights over
sharing.72
These cultural differences are reflected in a number of aspects of the
procedures and substance of the Japanese patent system.7a The first-to-
file system is primary among these. This system favors those who are
expeditious in utilizing the system at the expense of the individual inven-
tor who invents first but files "last."74  The incentive to file quickly 75
66. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I-X (establishing the importance of the rights of
individuals).
67. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 232; Donald M. Spero, Patent Protection or Piracy---A CEO
Views Japan, HARV. BUs. REV. 58 (Sept.-Oct. 1990).
U.S. patent law clearly embraces the individual. While inventors are always free to assign
their rights to a business or other economic concern, U.S. patent law does not permit such an
entity to apply for the patent. Rather, the law requires that the "flesh and blood" inventor(s)
be the applicants. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 233; see also 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1990).
68. The U.S. system follows a "contractual approach" in which disclosure is conditioned
on granting the application and the exclusive rights; if the application is rejected or if the
applicant is not satisfied with the scope of his or her claims and does not accept the grant, then
there is no requirement for disclosure. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 232.
69. Yasuhei Taniguchi, Japanese legal scholar and Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford
Univ., Presentation to the Japanese Legal Systems class, Stanford Law School (Mar. 5, 1991).
70. Hattori, supra note 13.
71. Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 1; Helfgott, supra note 2, at 234; JPO Materials,
supra note 20, at 5; Spero, supra note 67, at 58 (The Japanese system "serves a larger, national
goal: the rapid spread of technological know-how among competitors in a manner that avoids
litigation, encourages broad-scale cooperation, and promotes Japanese industry as a whole.").
72. Hattori, supra note 13.
73. This article does not claim that these cultural differences are the cause of the particu-
lars of the Japanese system. Rather, it is one factor that must be considered when viewing the
development and implementation of the system.
74. Cf. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 233 (U.S. first-to-invent system promotes the patentee
over speed of utilization of the patent system).
75. "[Ihe Japanese first-to-file system does not require a reduction to practice prior to
filing and therefore not many applicants conduct studies of the feasibility of commercializing
H~rIwoS Comm/ENT L.J. [Vol. 15:123
U.S. CRITICISMS OF THE JAPANESE PATENT SYSTEM
allows the latest innovations to be made public, through the KOKAI
system, at the earliest possible date. Thus, sharing of the latest informa-
tion throughout industry is promoted.
Together, the first-to-file and KOKAI systems operate as intrinsic
inducements to the increase of patent applications. 6 It is obvious that
the KOKAI system" and the deferred examination are at the heart of
the sharing of information. Laying open after eighteen months, deferring
examination for up to seven years, and delays in patent prosecution if
and when the examination is requested all combine to make innovations
available to industry long before exclusive rights are granted.
While industry does not generally infringe inventions after their publi-
cation, studying of the publication permits industry to make slight
modifications of the published invention, to superinvent, to come up
with improvements and even file use applications, and generally to fur-
ther stimulate innovation in a direction of avoiding infringement.'8
In this way, publication of applications further serves as a "warning" to
others in the industry; competitors know what the applicant is working
on and can modify their own investments so as to avoid infringement
down the road.' 9 It has been suggested that the JPO has chosen to inter-
pret claims as narrowly as possible, with an eye toward avoiding infringe-
ment and litigation, often limiting applicants to specific examples, so as
to minimize the effect of exclusive rights.8 0 This may also be one reason
why Japanese industry has historically chosen to file narrowly drawn ap-
plications.8" Rather than seek broad protection to prevent others from
competing in the technology generally, applicants seek only to protect
the specific embodiments which they plan on practicing.82
These goals, in the context of a system that favors public benefits
over individual patent rights, may explain why the doctrine of
equivalents does not really exist in Japan. 3 The Japanese courts see the
public's reliance on the claim language as a limiting factor, and give them
their inventions prior to demanding examinations, if at all." Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note
12, at 236; Hattori, supra note 13 (a "paper invention" is permissible).
76. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 5.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 20 and 21.
78. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 234.
79. Hattori, supra note 13.
80. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 234-35; see also Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
81. Despite the new multiple claim system, Japanese applicants continue to file in the
traditional style. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 5 (comment of John B. Pegram, Esq.,
New York Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Assoc.).
82. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 235.
83. Hattori, supra note 13. The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine in which
patent holders can prevent the patenting or use of a device or process which, although not
identical to their own patents, performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result. Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877). See
also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); Pennwalt Corp. v.
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priority over the interests of the patentee. 84 In effect, the courts often
limit claims to the embodiment shown in the specifications. The reluc-
tance to protect against infringement by equivalents "is based on the
view that legal certainty should prevail over the patentee's interest," and
"is the logical result of their court's lack of jurisdiction to hold the claim
invalid.""5
There is another major factor that can explain the JPO's limited
approach to patent claims, as well as the number of patents. Following
an incremental style of innovation, the Japanese view "[s]mall inventions
and innovations which have the possibilities of improving quality and
productivity of goods" as worthy of patents,8 6 or at least applications for
the purpose of publication. In other words, the Japanese do not focus
only on major scientific breakthroughs, but work on bringing about in-
cremental improvements and then turning these into products.87 Such
an incremental approach lends itself naturally to applications with nar-
row claims.88 In this fashion, a Japanese company claims its particular
embodiment-its specific innovation-without having exclusive rights
over all related technology. This approach serves the overall goals of
adding to the scientific literature, rather than seeking monopolies, and of
promoting improvements in industry.89 As a direct result, the greater
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987). But see London v. Carson Pirie
Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (doctrine is the exception, not the rule).
84. Daus, supra note 3, at 476-77; Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 70. In interpreting the
scope of a claim, neither file wrapper estoppel nor prosecution history estoppel are utilized, at
least to the same extent as in the United States. It is explained that this is due to fairness
concerns, because histories are not published. In order to get the file wrapper, one needs to go
to Tokyo, an undertaking believed to be too expensive and time-consuming for those not close
to Tokyo. Hattori, supra note 13.
85. Daus, supra note 3, at 477.
86. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 5. See supra text accompanying note 71; see gener-
ally Neil Gross, A Wave of Ideas, Drop by Drop, Bus. WK. 22 (June 16, 1989). Patent attorney
Ken Hattori stresses that in Japan, the applicant must show "meritorious effect" of the subject
matter of the application to get a patent. He notes that the Japanese are technology-oriented,
with patent examiners more interested in the technological "guts" of an application than its
ability to instruct others in how to work the patent. Hattori, supra note 13. This, however, is
not at odds with the incremental step approach. At issue in the intersection of these philoso-
phies is the question: What is "meritorious effect"? It seems clear that in Japan, incremental
innovations that improve quality or productivity are meritorious.
However, Mr. Hattori believes a problem with the Japanese patent system is its failure to
take into account secondary considerations. As he explains it, in a U.S. filing, if the subject
matter does not offer a technical advantage, but nevertheless "increases speed, lower costs, [or]
deals with a long term problem," this is often enough for the patent to issue. Id. However, his
view is that this is not the case before the JPO, which will require a technical advantage. Id.
87. See Otis Port, Back to Basics, Bus. WK. 14 (June 16, 1989).
88. James A. Sheridan, Esq., Secretary, San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Asso-
ciation, and member, U.S. Bar/JPO Liaison Council, Presentation to the Japanese Patent
Study Group (Oct. 18, 1990).
89. Id.
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frequency of incremental changes, compared to major discoveries, cou-
pled with the urge to share, leads to a greater number of filings.
Related to this is the Japanese esteem for patents, a view which
helps further explain the number of patent applications filed. At a soci-
ocultural level, patents serve as credentials.9° One explanation may be
that because the incremental style of innovation does not lend itself to
media coverage9 that may otherwise bring acclaim, sheer numbers of
patents serve as a mark of creativity.
"Patents as credentials" has a direct effect on business, where they
are viewed as major barometers of enterprise activities.92 Businesses en-
courage the filing of applications, being able to use the sheer number of
their filings as propaganda. 9a For the employee, the number of applica-
tions produced can be an important factor in moving up in the com-
pany.94 This has a "double strength" effect on the number of filings:
first, there is the general encouragement to file; second, having research-
ers and engineers directly file applications leads to many applications for
"ideas," and little incentive to self-screen applications. 95
Finally, and closely related, are the business uses of applications and
granted patents. As mentioned earlier, applications are used defensively
to avoid problems of infringement, wasteful investment, and, potentially,
litigation.96 In fact, a majority of applications, both patent and utility
model, are left unexamined-their main purpose is "to show others what
a particular company is doing ...."97
Patents are also used "offensively." This is especially effective in the
Japanese system which favors cross-licensing over litigation.9 In this
context, patent numbers give a company bargaining power. First, for
example, if Company A holds a patent for a basic technology, Company
B may seek to improve the technology and gain power by receiving its
90. Id.
91. "Such piecemeal advances rarely get heralded in the press, so the whole process re-
mains invisible to most people.... Only other engineers appreciate the creativity behind such
gradual progress." Gross, supra note 86, at 22.
92. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 5; Yoshimura, supra note 15.
93. Yoshimura, supra note 15.
94. Id.
95. Sheridan, supra note 88. See also Hattori, supra note 13 (U.S. specifications are done
by lawyers, and with an eye toward enablement. In Japan, applications are often done by
engineers who "use words rather than sentences," and emphasize the technical benefits rather
than enablement).
96. See supra notes 78-80, and accompanying text; Yoshimura, supra note 15.
97. Helfgott, supra note 2, at 235.
98. Spero, supra note 67, at 60, 64. A speaker at the Study Group emphasized the role of
patent numbers in the context of cross-licensing negotiations. Carl Silverman, Esq., Intellec-
tual Property Counsel, Intel Corporation, Presentation to the Japanese Patent Study Group
(Nov. 8, 1990).
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own patents on the incremental innovations. Therefore, the improve-
ments encircle the basic technology, and B is able to effect a trade off of
its improvements for A's basic technology.99 Second, the sheer number
of patents can be used as power to encourage others to cross-license
whole "libraries" of patents. In other words, Company A may want
some key technologies of B, and offer its entire library of patents, or key
patents, as the payment; hence, the more patents A has, the better the
deal for B, the better chance A will have technology wanted by B, and/or
the more patents A can seek from B. Third, the more patents a company
has, the greater a fee it can collect when negotiating a cross-license. For
example, whether or not Company B wants to use all patents in Com-
pany A's library, the more it has access to A's patents, the more A can be
expected to negotiate for a larger fee.
III
An Introduction to U.S. Criticisms and Their Analysis
As might be expected, criticisms of the Japanese system frequently
arise where its procedures and substance seek to support goals that differ
from those of the U.S. system. However, it is simplistic to say that cul-
tural differences are the sole cause. First, a number of criticisms address
the implementation and use or abuse of procedures and substance that do
not necessarily promote any stated societal goal. In addition, where cul-
tural differences are implicated, it may be impossible to say if the differ-
ence shaped the system, or arose because of the system.
The following three sections of this article identify criticisms often
heard from U.S. businesses and government. For each criticism, the ap-
plicable structural and cultural influences are highlighted in an attempt
to clarify any "front-end" misunderstandings. The criticism is then ex-
plored to better understand whether it is based on a misunderstanding,
an unfair or inequitable practice, or simply a necessary or "acceptable"
structural or cultural difference in approach. In this context, recent ef-
forts by the JPO to address various criticisms are detailed. Also, an at-
tempt is made to discover where problems are based, not so much on
differences in the nationality of the systems, but on the size of the appli-
cant's business. While the validity of some criticisms may be definitively
addressed, it is impossible to do so with others, especially where the issue
comes down simply to differences in goals of the patent system.
99. Yoshimura, supra note 15. This is also referred to as "patent flooding," and is a major
U.S. criticism that is discussed below. See generally Spero, supra note 67.
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Finally, it must also be recognized that there is no universal agree-
ment among U.S. critics that the Japanese system does, in fact, present a
problem for U.S. business. In 1988, for example,
Nels T. Lippert, a partner in the law firm of Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper
and Scinto (New York City), note[d] that a number of U.S. companies
[were] putting together a statement that they have no problems with
the Japanese patent system. "I haven't had any," he says, in a practice
that covers chemicals, pharmaceuticals and some biotechnology pat-
ents for both U.S. and Japanese clients.l°°
In this vein, there is a credible argument to be made that most, if not
all, problems encountered come from a simple failure to gain an under-
standing of the Japanese system, and how it differs from USPTO prac-
tice. A practitioner has opined that the "problems Americans have with
Japan's patent system... are 'largely of their own making,' by failing to
adapt to Japan's ways."' 01 At the least, the majority of the identified
problems are faced equally by Japanese nationals; thus, it is not a ques-
tion of an inherently discriminatory system, at least with regard to na-
tionality of the applicant. 102
IV
Getting Behind U.S. Criticisms of Japanese Procedure
A number of criticisms arise under the rubric of procedure. In this
section, criticisms of the following aspects of the JPO practice are ana-
lyzed: costs of using the system; overload of, and delays in using, the
system as a whole; the first-to-file process; laying open through the
KOKAI system; claims limitation; and the availability of the pre-grant
opposition.
A. Costs of Using the System-An Issue of Language
There has been some discussion of the expense of using the Japanese
patent system. However, in terms of filing and other fees, the costs are
100. Joseph F. Dunphy, Japan's Patent System Comes Under Fire, CHEM. WK. (June 27,
1988) at 26-27.
101. Id. (comment of Harold C. Wegner, Esq., of Wegner and Bretschneider, Washington,
D.C.).
102. For example, procedures such as first-to-file, laying open, and oppositions apply to all
applications (the latter applies if examination is requested). If discrimination does exist, it may
be in a system that favors the whole over an individual, and perhaps large companies over
small. See Spero, supra note 67, at 58.
On the other hand, the Japanese can point to "discrimination" in the U.S. system, at least
to the degree that the first-to-invent system impairs the ability of a foreigner to claim that he or
she was the first inventor. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 4. See 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
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actually low' 03 -part of the incentive to encourage filings. The real issue
arises in the context of the requirement that applications must be in Japa-
nese at the time of filing.
A large part of the expense of filing in Japan, perhaps even half the
cost, comes from the need to translate the application into Japanese.'°4
While it is true that the USPTO allows filing in any language, it too
requires a verified translation within two months of filing.' 5 Thus, ex-
cept for a matter of timing, both the USPTO and JPO require a domestic
language application.
One cannot seriously criticize a country for requiring filings in the
language understood by its examiners. One may ask, however, why the
original language text is not submitted with the translation (for reference
in case of translation errors), or why a two-month translation period is
not employed. On the U.S. side, it can first be pointed out that this sys-
tem has been employed and works. Second, because errors cannot be
corrected once filed with the JPO, some would prefer to file in a foreign
language and translate after prosecution, or at least be able to file in a
foreign language for purposes of priority."0 One U.S.-based argument is
that the U.S. approach would avoid losing rights and having applications
invalidated based on easily corrected translation errors.1
0 7
On the other hand, the JPO view is that the first-to-file system
makes the checking of the English text content impossible.108 The time
delay is seen as not changing what is perceived as the real problem-poor
U.S. translations. 10 9
The language issue thus has another cost. This is the cost associated
with allocating insufficient time to the translation which results in a
faulty application. The JPO has stated that it suffers from poor transla-
tions, often when translations are requested on a rush basis.1o This can
create havoc for the Japanese examiners trying to understand what is
being claimed and the specification. One study noted that the JPO often
103. Yoshimura, supra note 15. Effective January 1, 1988, revisions in the fee schedule
were implemented which resulted "in a higher registration fee but substantial reductions in the
fees for the first claim and any additional claims." Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 237.
104. Silverman, supra note 98; Sheridan, supra note 88.
105. See supra text accompanying note 13.
106. Sheridan, supra note 88.
107. See Memorandum from William S. Thompson, President, American Intellectual
Property Law Association, to members of AIPLA regarding harmonization of patent laws (on
file with Hastings Comm/Ent Law Journal) [hereinafter AIPLA letter].
108. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 4 (comments of Fumitake Yoshida, Special Ad-
visor & Former Commissioner, Japanese Patent Office) (on file with Hastings Comm/Ent Law
Journal).
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 3-4.
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tells applicants that disclosure is insufficient to support claims for being
"not understandable," a rarity with the USPTO and EPO. This may be
due to translation problems. 1' Ken Hattori, a member of the Japanese
patent bar and the first Japanese national to qualify as a U.S. patent at-
torney, believes that eighty percent of the problems U.S. applicants face
before the JPO is due to translation: "Language is the biggest problem
because patent is a game of language. Even a small mistranslation can
create big problems."' '12 U.S. applicants run into problems because they
usually send English-text applications directly to Japanese law firms to
be filed.' 3 This decreases the applicant's understanding of the transla-
tion, and cuts out an opportunity to get a better understanding of the
Japanese system. And, as a result, the applicant faces greater difficulty in
communicating directly with the translators, foreign counsel, the JPO,
and so forth." 4 A U.S. business executive admonishes:
A straight translation is never perfect, and in any event, it is unlikely
to address adequately the rules and narrow interpretations of the Japa-
nese patent system. In a dispute, the Japanese version is the ruling
document-translation errors and all. If you must file a patent directly
translated from English, first have the Japanese text retranslated into
English by an independent, professional translator. This is a critical
opportunity to improve the Japanese filing."'
On the other side, the Japanese have few translation problems when
dealing with the USPTO. First, Japanese companies devote the time,
economic, and personnel resources necessary to obtain a better under-
standing of foreign patent systems and language." 16 Second, Japanese
companies send only a very few of their applications directly to a U.S.
law firm for filing, in an approach diametrically opposed to that of U.S.
companies. Instead, they first send the applications to a Japanese law
firm and have them translated, and then review the translation before
sending them to the United States. In this way they can understand what
is written in English rather than waiting to amend it at a later date.' 17
These experiences suggest that the majority of translation problems faced
by U.S. applicants in Japan are ultimately caused by the failure of U.S.
applicants to adequately appreciate the importance of translation. It is
quite possible that U.S. applicants misunderstand the interaction between
translation and the substantive and procedural rules of the Japanese sys-
tem. Alternatively, the differences between Japanese and the European
111. Kalikow, supra note 2, at 298.
112. Hattori, supra note 13.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Spero, supra note 67, at 65.
116. Hattori, supra note 13.
117. Id.
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languages as accepted in the EPO are underestimated. On a more funda-
mental level, such problems might stem from a failure to gain an under-
standing of how to use the Japanese patent system effectively, or at least
a failure to take advantage of opportunities to gain a better understand-
ing of that system.
However, it is not possible to determine whether a post-filing trans-
lation period, or some type of "liberalized" correction system, should be
implemented in the JPO. Both the USPTO and JPO have sound argu-
ments for their systems. The United States can argue that it is not equi-
table to defeat an application because of correctable error-and allow
such errors to be changed as a matter of course. On the other hand, the
Japanese may see this system as failing to encourage greater care in
translations, as adding to delays in prosecuting the patent, and as possi-
bly allowing abuse through translation corrections which operate as
claim amendments.
B. JPO Overload and Time Delays
The JPO has often been criticized for the sheer overload it suffers
and the delays this causes in processing applications."' The criticism is
likely compounded because of the laying open process. Laying open cou-
pled with delays means that the applicant's technology is made known
publicly for a significant period of time while the applicant has only the
potential right to compensation for unauthorized uses.119 The first-to-file
system, which ties priority to filing dates, is also a factor. Where the
application is denied, or additional materials are requested that require
refiling, the applicant will lose its priority date. In these situations, the
longer the application is laid open before the applicant learns of the need
to refile, the greater the chance that the applicant might lose its rights
altogether.
The United States has an approximately eighteen-month review pe-
riod, although the period is longer for some technologies. 2 o The JPO, in
response to a U.S. request, is attempting to regain the 1981 average of 24
months within the next five years. 121 However, conversion to a paperless
118. See Dunphy, supra note 100, at 26-27; Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 1-2; see
generally Harold Brown, Competitiveness, Technology and U.S.-Japan Relations, WASH. Q.,
Summer 1990, at 85.
119. Patent Law, supra note 1, at art. 65.
120. Sheridan, supra note 88; Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 2. Note that the
USPTO uses a different measuring process than the JPO or EPO. Id.
121. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 2. For clarification, note that "Mr. Helfgott
suggested that the [Government of Japan's] goal is, in effect, one of an average filing-to-grant
period of 24 months plus a time for pre-grant opposition." Id. This is in comparison with a
period until ultimate grant. Id. Some have criticized that the period is even longer, along the
lines of four to six years. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
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program has temporarily driven the average examination period in Japan
to thirty-five months. For a final comparison, the EPO average is thirty
months,12 2 although it does eliminate the need to undergo multiple na-
tional examinations. 123
Obviously, the limited number of examiners and the sheer number
of applications are major factors in these delays. The problem is com-
pounded by "a rising level of technological sophistication and complexity
and [the] larger volume of data for examination [that] is being accumu-
lated." 124 A USPTO Commissioner has "attributed the high number of
Japanese patent filings and the tremendous backlog of pending applica-
tions" to the recently-amended practice of permitting only one invention
to be claimed per application. 125
1. Comprehensive Measures to Improve Overload and Delays
The prospect of increasing application numbers and examination de-
lays during the 1970s originally led the Japanese to adopt the laying open
and request for exam system in 1970.126 At the same time, the United
States opted not to adopt these systems but to increase the number of its
examiners. 127 As it now appears, the 1970 changes were not able to meet
the prospects in the long term-perhaps because the phenomenal growth
of the Japanese market was not fully anticipated at the time.
The JPO has undertaken a number of comprehensive measures to
deal with the delay problem:
a. Increase the number of patent examiners in the JPO
The problem with increasing the numbers of examiners is two-fold.
First, examiners are considered public officials, not employees, and any
plans to increase the number of examiners must conform with adminis-
trative reform policies.1 21 Second, as officials, qualified examiners must
pass a national exam held by the National Personnel Authority. In 1988,
the pass rate of qualified candidates was only six percent. 2 9 Addition-
ally, after the test, examiners must be trained. They progress from assis-
122. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 2.
123. Kalikow, supra note 2, at 291.
124. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 3.
125. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 236 (citing 36 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 239 (1988)).
126. Views, supra note 5, at 1035-36.
127. Id. at 1036.
128. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, Attachment IV, at 1; Hattori, supra note 13.
129. Views, supra note 5, at 1040 (Yasushige Hashimoto, speaking).
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tant examiner to primary examiner through four years of training and
work experience.' 30
While the number of examiners has been restricted in accord with
the Seventh Retrenchment Program, which began in 1987, "the Japanese
Government regarded delays in examining patent applications to be an
issue of great urgency. 13 1 The Government therefore authorized in-
creasing the "number of examiners by thirty in fiscal 1989 for the first
time in nine years, [followed by an] additional increase of thirty examin-
ers in fiscal 1990.",132 The JPO has promised to continue this increase. 33
However, doubts have been expressed that the reason the numbers
have been kept low is solely because of attempts to restrict government
employment or the difficulty in getting candidates. Rather, it has been
alleged that MITI, 34 to which the JPO reports, 35 has a "notorious pol-
icy of providing an inadequate number of patent examiners.', 136 Ostensi-
bly, the policy is to maintain the long application pendency period so as
to allow time for competitors-presumably Japanese companies-to
study the technology.1
37
b. Employment of experts to assist examiners
Since fiscal 1990, former JPO examiners with specialized knowledge
of particular technologies, as well as examination experience, have been
employed to assist in examinations. 38
c. Paperless Project
Beginning in 1984, the "goal of the Paperless Project is the construc-
tion of the total system for computerizing all procedures from filing ap-
plications, through examination, up through grant of right." '39 Two
ways in which this should speed up the process and improve the quality
of exams regard searching the prior art. First, the JPO is developing an
F-term retrieval system, a database retrieval system which allows for
searching only the appropriate prior art more efficiently." 4 Using this
system, examiners are able to search all files and analyze all editions of
KOKAI TOKKYO KOHO and KOKOKU KOHO through the use of
130. Id.
131. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, Attachment IV, at 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
135. Dunphy, supra note 100, at 27.
136. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
137. Id.
138. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, Attachment IV, at 1.
139. Views, supra note 5, at 1037.
140. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, Attachment IV, at 2.
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key words and search formulae.1 41 Second, the JPO is developing an
industrial property information service system that will better enable ap-
plicants to search prior art before filing.'42
d. Contracting with a specialized outside agency for prior art searches
The development of the F-term retrieval system, which employs a
standard format, has allowed for contracting with outside sources for
searches. 4 3 For example, 10,244 such preliminary searches were con-
ducted in fiscal 1989, 20,000 were budgeted for fiscal 1990, and the target
for fiscal 1993 is 100,000.11
Also, effective September 1985, "Japan's International Applications
Law was amended to permit the use of international searches ... carried
out by an International Searching Authority other than the [JPO].' ' 45
Thus, "in the case of international applications under the [Patent Coop-
eration Treaty], the understaffed examining departments of the [JPO]
will now be able to utilize reports on prior art searches carried out by the
prestigious [EPO]."' 141
e. Asking for stricter screening of applications and requests for examinations
This article has previously explored the influences that promote pat-
ent filings. 147 To counter these incentives, the JPO has requested major
companies to begin screening applications and examination requests. 48
In effect, the request is to change patent management from quantity-fo-
cused to quality-focused. 149 It has been reported that since the campaign
began in 1987, the number of total patent and utility model applications
has fallen for the first time in seventeen years. 150
141. Yoshimura, supra note 15.
142. Note that applications filed with the USPTO must reveal all relevant prior art, or face
patent denial. Spero, supra note 67, at 66. While the JPO requires such disclosure, there are
no penalties for failure to do so. Makiko Ogihara, Mitsubishi-Fusion Dispute on Lamp Patent
May Turn to Global Showdown on Standards, JAPAN ECON. J., Aug. 27, 1988, at 1 (chart
comparing U.S. and Japanese systems).
143. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, Attachment IV, at 1.
144. Id.
145. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 236.
146. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76, 90-99.
148. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, Attachment IV, at 3.
149. JPO Materials, supra note 20, at 3. A speaker before the Study Group pointed out
that the quantity of patent applications caused great difficulty for Japanese companies in trying
to decide which patents to file abroad and which patents to negotiate. Silverman, supra note
98.
150. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, Attachment IV, at 3. See supra text accompanying
note 53.
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f. Utilization of publications for disclosure of technologies
In an attempt to channel the cultural underpinnings of the patent
system, the JPO "has requested industrial sectors not to file patent appli-
cations for technologies whose need for patent rights are thought to be
relatively weak, and instead to make those technologies public by disclos-
ing them in publications."'' The Japanese Institute of Invention and
Innovation's publication KOKAI-GIHO is being made more attractive
for this purpose. 3 2
g. Accelerated examination system
This system, mentioned above,' 53 is felt to give some advantages to
foreign applicants. The primary advantage is the use of non-JPO prior
art searches, without additional charge."5 4 However, its use is mainly for
subject matter that is being practiced before the grant of rights, and the
resources allocated to it are limited. 55
2. Structural Delay--Request for Exam
The criticism of the request for exam system, in which applicants
can have up to seven years to request an exam, is that patent rights are
not clarified for a number of years, thereby impacting marketing and in-
vestment decisions.' 56 However, two aspects of this criticism denigrate
its validity.
First, the causes of the criticism are not really a direct result of the
request system, per se. For example, given the applicant's ability to re-
quest examination, rights yet to be clarified are more closely related to
delays in the examination process-whether or not the exam starts auto-
matically. And, if the issue is length of time during which competitors
have access to an application before rights are granted, then this is really
a criticism of the KOKAI system rather than of the request system.
Second, U.S. companies can, and do, take advantage of the option
offered by the first-to-file and exam request system by filing as they go
along to gain priority, and then deciding later which application to drop
and which to pursue.'57 Thus, meeting the criticism requires companies
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying note 27.
154. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, Attachment IV, at 3.
155. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 236.
156. AIPLA letter, supra note 107, at 3. While the EPO also has a delay system, it requires
that the exam be requested within six months after laying open/publication. Kalikow, supra
note 2, at 294.
157. Sheridan, supra note 88.
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to carefully plan out their filing strategy. First, they should file early, 5"
and request the exam as soon as possible if they believe the filed subject
matter will be utilized. Second, their "goal should be to get patents is-
sued (if possible) before building significant sales and making the market
value obvious to potential competitors."' 59
This area might in fact represent a big versus small company prob-
lem, rather than a domestic versus foreign company problem. Big com-
panies can file as they go along; smaller companies generally take longer
to develop a patent fully and then file. I ° Therefore, by not being able to
take advantage of the system, smaller companies may be more critical of
this aspect of the system that, in conjunction with other aspects, may be
utilized to allow inequitable behavior.
C. The First-to-File System
The main criticism of the first-to-file system is that it rewards who-
ever wins the race to the patent office, not the first to invent.' 6' Thus, if
the technology comes to the attention of a competitor through "permissi-
ble means," such as exhibiting the technology at a trade show, the com-
petitor can get the patent on the technology if it files first.
This criticism could apply equally to all first-to-file systems. How-
ever, it does not seem to be directed against the EPO. It is possible that
some in the United States believe Japanese competitors take unfair ad-
vantage of the combined first-to-invent/publication system. A spokes-
man for a Japanese firm has another explanation of this asymmetry,
reasoning that "disputes occur because Japanese companies are highly
competitive with their U.S. counterparts while Europeans have a long
way to catch up.' 62 As with the exam request system, it may be that the
real problem is not first-to-file, per se, but how some companies find ways
to acquire competitors' technology and then file on it first.
In terms of validity, it is hard to criticize a system that is employed
everywhere else in the world--especially when the United States is seri-
ously considering adopting a first-to-file approach as part of the global
patent harmonization process.1 63 Further, the Japanese started with a
U.S.-style system, only later adopting the German patent law ap-
proach."M The result was that eighty percent of cases were treated the
same under first-to-file, while the significant burden on examiners to de-
158. Spero, supra note 67, at 65.
159. Id.
160. Sheridan, supra note 88.
161. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
162. Ogihara, supra note 142, at 6.
163. See, e.g., AIPLA Letter, supra note 107, at 1-2.
164. Views, supra note 5, at 1033-34.
19921
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
termine filing dates was eliminated.16 Given the world-wide consensus
and the burden on examiners, a switch back-not that it is seriously con-
sidered-could only worsen delays and hinder harmonization.
D. Laying Open
As might be expected, the criticism of laying open is that it allows
competitors to examine others' innovations before substantial rights are
granted, if ever.' 66 But this is not the complete criticism. Implicitly, and
at times explicitly, the criticism entails the belief that competitors will
use the disclosure, together with a sufficiently long pendency period and
weak pre-grant rights, to the applicant's disadvantage. Consider the fol-
lowing charge: "Competitors use [the pendency period] to familiarize
themselves with technologies that are disclosed and then often take the
inventions of others into the marketplace without bearing the R&D
costs."167 This implicit "criticism within a criticism" speaks, at least in
part, to the use--or abuse-of the system, or deficiencies in the system.
Are there merits to these criticisms? Here, recognizing cultural dif-
ferences between the United States and Japan is critical. The U.S. per-
spective is that patents exist to protect individuals, 68 so anything that
jeopardizes the individual is disfavored. Proponents of the U.S. system
point to its confidentiality. Not only does this prevent competitors from
learning an application's substance, it also preserves the applicant's abil-
ity to claim trade secret protection, when applicable, for the technology if
the patent is denied.
On the other hand, it is the goal of the Japanese system to share
technology among competitors. 6 9 While publication directly serves this
function, it also serves as a warning to other companies so that they may
avoid infringement and wasteful investments from duplicative efforts.
With this in mind, it is instructive to note a 1966 U.S. patent system
revisions study that found affording protection encouraged early public
disclosure which reduced the likelihood of duplication of efforts and en-
couraged innovation. 7 ° To this end, it recommended that pending appli-
cations be published eighteen to twenty-four months after the earliest
effective filing date.' 7 ' Although not ultimately adopted, it further illus-
trates the credibility of such a system.
165. Id.
166. Spero, supra note 67, at 66; Dunphy, supra note 100, at 26.
167. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
168. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
170. Views, supra note 5, at 1035.
171. Id. at 1036.
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The issue then is misuse of the system. It must therefore be viewed
in the context of Japan's economic structure. Japanese companies, and
the patent practice in general, specifically intend to protect only narrowly
defined innovations, encouraging other companies to create closely re-
lated innovations. 172 On the one hand, it is charged that Japanese com-
panies take competitors' technology into the marketplace as their own; 173
on the other hand, there is the view that industry does not infringe gener-
ally, but rather legitimately uses the laying open process to modify,
superinvent, and innovate. 174 So, there is an unanswerable question-
any answer necessarily being culturally influenced-as to where one can
draw the line between activities that are abusive and those that are sim-
ply following the Japanese understanding and goals of their own system.
This does not mean that the laying open process cannot, or is not,
used at times to the disadvantage of an applicant. However, it is not
laying open, per se, but the combination of narrow claim interpretation,
availability of pre-grant opposition, and limited rights prior to grant,
along with laying open, that invite a particular misuse of the system-
particularly "patent-flooding." These issues are dealt with in materials
to follow.
At this point, the question to keep in mind is whether problems aris-
ing from early disclosure are related more to company size than national-
ity. In other words, for laying open to be misused effectively, the misuser
must have the resources to monitor competitors' patent filings. Simi-
larly, the victim will be more susceptible if it is unable to monitor patent
filings to determine whether its technology is being taken. 175 Supporting
this point, and exposing a possible link to company nationality as well as
size, is one U.S. business executive's explanation: "As a practical matter,
the Japanese patent system's push toward diffusion of knowledge ulti-
mately leads to the concentration of technology in the hands of compa-
nies with an insider's access to the system and with the economic
horsepower to manipulate it to their advantage."' 176
172. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text,
173. See supra text accompanying note 167.
174. See supra text accompanying note 78.
175. Spero, supra note 67, at 65; Hattori, supra note 13 (issue of costs of screening submis-
sions raised during open discussion).
176. Spero, supra note 67, at 58.
Secondary size issues also arise. Are smaller companies more likely to be the victims of
misuse, regardless of nationality? If so, the reason may be that smaller companies are disad-
vantaged in seeking resolutions of patent disputes-both in terms of bargaining power and
resources for court actions.
1992]
E. Claims Limitation and Narrow Interpretation
Both the JPO and Japanese courts are criticized as being stricter in
interpretation than either the USPTO or EPO.'7 7 U.S. members of the
U.S. Bar/JPO Liaison Council reported that their "experience is that ex-
aminers in Japan want more exemplification and limitation of the claims
to specific examples than in other countries, except perhaps the [former]
U.S.S.R."17 Even an attorney who does not believe the Japanese system
is problematic likens the "'uniquely narrow' scope of the Japanese pat-
ents ... to 'mining claims.' "179 U.S. members of the Council explained
that such strict interpretation "produce[s] less protection than is thought
to be deserved and require[s] the filing of more divisional applications,
which results in more work for the JPO and more work and expense for
the applicants."'1 0
The heart of the criticism against narrow claim interpretation is that
it leads to an ineffective scope of protection.'' In other words, competi-
tors will be able to produce and patent technologies and innovations that
are very similar to, and potentially functionally equivalent to, an appli-
cant's application. "In one case, for example, American Cyanamid at-
tempted to enforce a patent for a process using a definitive temperature
range beginning at 20°C, while in Japan the accused infringer practiced
the process at 17.5°C. Cyanamid lost.' 8I 2 In terms of filing, "[i]f you
patent a chemical formula at 3%, for example, someone else may patent
one at 2% or 4%-even if the difference is functionally irrelevant."
' 18 3
177. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 5 (The JPO takes exception with this criticism,
viewing it as a "rumor." It also points out that the United States provides narrower protection
than itself in certain chemical cases.); Hattori, supra note 13; see generally Brown, supra note
118.
178. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 5. Applicants, particularly with chemical inven-
tions who try to provide as many combinations as possible in their claims, face examiners
requiring them to provide test results for each. Sheridan, supra note 88; see Dunphy, supra
note 100, at 27. An application can be rejected for "insufficiency of disclosure" under Patent
Law art. 36(3), which includes occasions when "the working examples are insufficient to sup-
port the claims ...." Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 4.
179. Dunphy, supra note 100, at 27 (quoting Harold C. Wegner, Esq.). This attorney also
points out, and accurately so, that such an approach equally makes "Japanese [inventors] lose
there [at the JPO] all the time, too." Id.
180. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 5.
181. AIPLA Letter, supra note 107, at 3.
182. Dunphy, supra note 100, at 27.
183. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
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1. The Problem Compounded-No Doctrine of Equivalents or Broad Pioneer
Patent Protection
The Japanese system has no effective doctrine of equivalents.1 8 4 As
evidenced by the American Cyanamid example, this can lead to allowing
the working of a patent by slight changes that are functionally irrelevant.
While the United States may take a very broad approach to this doctrine,
it does not negate the fact that the comparisons in Japan are very lit-
eral. 185 While the absence of the doctrine would be less noticeable if the
protected claim were broader, the combination of narrow claim and no
such protection can render the strength of a grant of rights impotent.
The problem is further compounded by the lack of recognition of
broad protection for pioneer patents. 186 Thus, Japanese courts fail to ap-
ply "equitably broad" protection to pioneering inventions and discover-
ies."" This leads to allegations of infringement going unaddressed
because even a "never before seen" technology is limited strictly to what
is claimed, which is kept narrow by the examination.
2. A Japanese Perspective on the Criticism
A Japanese perspective on the criticism raises a number of issues.
The first, which has already been explored, is that there are a number of
differences in the goals and culture of the Japanese patent system that
lead examiners to require narrow claims, Japanese companies to file nar-
row claims, and courts to avoid using equitable doctrines such as
equivalents and pioneer patents.1 88  Encouraging innovation and
stressing industry over individual rights both play major roles.
The JPO can also point to modernization as addressing some of
these concerns. First, it has been stated that the excessively narrow
claim interpretation by courts is a historical phenomenon that is improv-
ing. The explanation is that
until about 7 years ago, the translation of U.S. applications was terri-
ble. Most technology from the U.S. was very new and there was little
prior art; so, applications were allowed based solely on the diagrams
they contained. If a suit was brought, the judge could not understand
the specification. But, since issued patents have a presumption of va-
184. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
185. Sheridan, supra note 88. However, the Federal Circuit recently indicated an intent to
treat the doctrine of equivalents as the exception and not the rule in patent infringement litiga-
tion. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Nevertheless,
the court still recognized the doctrine as valid in appropriate cases. Id.
186. In the United States, a patent for a "whole new" technology or process--one that
pioneers-is interpreted very broadly so as to allow protection potentially beyond a strict read-
ing of the (traditionally broad) claims. Hattori, supra note 13.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
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lidity, he would follow the diagrams specifically. Therefore, unless the
alleged infringement was an exact copy of the drawing, it was found
not infringing. Fortunately, translations have improved in the last five
years, so this should be less of a problem in the future.' 89
Second, the introduction of multiple claim practice, if allowed at the
exam level,' 90 logically should counterbalance, at least partially, narrow
interpretation. 91 This follows because several narrow claims will be
equivalent to a few broad claims.' 92 Also, the JPO's unity-of-invention
definition is broader than that of the USPTO.'93 This allows a greater
range of subject matter to be claimed in a single application. A third,
albeit partial, response is that even the USPTO will start to narrow the
range of equivalents it finds infringing as the number of patents held
valid increases. 194
3. U.S. Concerns Remain
Obviously, there is a subjective element in deciding when claims are
interpreted "too narrowly," especially when domestic socio-cultural fac-
tors favor narrow versus broad protection.' 95 Nevertheless, the criti-
cisms of claim interpretation raise valid concerns, and point out real
problems. In sum, the Japanese system fails to protect the "spirit of the
invention."' 96
This article has pointed out that the Japanese patent system seeks to
share information among competitors. However, another interpretation,
and one capable of existing alongside the other, is that Japan's modern-
day patent law "was enacted in the post-World War II period to protect
Japan's industry from being dominated by foreign companies who con-
duct basic research and own basic patents."' 97 The implication is that
the system must operate against any one company, of any nationality, to
189. Hattori, supra note 13.
190. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 5 (although multiple claims are to be refused on
a claim-by-claim basis).
191. However, to the extent that Japanese companies still employ the traditional system,
examiners will have a harder time adapting to this system. Id.
192. Of course, there is still the "problem" that for each claim added, more supporting
documentation, including test results where appropriate, will have to be supplied. See supra
notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
193. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 5.
194. Sheridan, supra note 88.
195. The emphasis on individual rights and broad protection in the context of patents for
"major changes" must conflict with a view of group rights and narrow protection in the con-
text of patents for incremental innovations.
196. Hattori, supra note 13.
197. Dunphy, supra note 100, at 26 (quoting Larry W. Evans, director of the patent and
license division at BP America). Equitable principles existed a century ago, but were done
away with when Japan was opened to the foreign influences. Hattori, supra note 13. One can
question whether doing away with equity was a way to prevent foreigners from gaining too
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prevent it from obtaining broad rights over technology, especially in the
form of basic-i.e., pioneer-patents. At the same time, such a system
still permits an ultimate goal of supporting industry as a whole as long as
companies adapt to the many-application, small innovation ideology. 9
Lack of equity is another valid criticism.' 99 First, there is the pio-
neer patent. Granted, to a significant degree this may be a cultural differ-
ence, because "overly broad" protection is not necessarily required.
However, an invention that is the first of its kind should equitably garner
enough protection to allow the patent holder to control at least the full
range of uses claimed in the application.
The absence of a doctrine of equivalents, in the context of narrow
claim interpretation, is a painfully significant shortcoming. One is hard
pressed to understand how using a patented process at a temperature
slightly different from what is claimed is not infringement. 200 This
hyper-literal interpretation defeats the basic concept of the patent-there
is no protection to trade off against disclosure. Furthermore, allowing
patents for slightly altered inventions and processes that do not function-
ally differ from earlier patents appears to contradict directly the promo-
tion of innovation and the granting of some degree of exclusive rights in
the patent in the first place. Even if such filings or grants do not happen
frequently, when they do they seem to amount to legalized infringement,
or at least sanctioned compulsory licensing, because the holder of the
first patent is forced to enter into a cross-licensing agreement.2 '
Such an approach to claims is the major component of the abusive
practice known as "patent flooding." It is precisely the ability of a com-
petitor to gain patents for technology that is only a shade different from
that already patented which allows it to surround this basic technol-
ogy. 20 2 Competitors can then force applicants, at least those who do not
have equal bargaining power, to deal on the competitors' terms. In other
words, later applicants can basically bar patented technology from use-
broad a grant of rights while, ultimately, not harming Japanese industry, which followed a
different approach to innovation and advancement.
198. However, it also follows that domestic industry may be protected only so long as
foreign industry does not collectively make use of the system in the same fashion or only for as
long as other national systems do not do the same to Japanese companies.
199. Hattori, supra note 13.
200. Donald Spero gives an example which highlights this point. In his company's dispute
with Mitsubishi, he writes about "[Mitsubishi's] sashimi patents, those representing only thin
slices of difference from our proprietary technology. It is as though we had patented the bicy-
cle only to have a competitor patent the bicycle with red pedals or a basket or chrome handle-
bars." Spero, supra note 67, at 62.
201. See infra notes 232-49 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
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and all without any equitable recourse to guarantee an economically fea-
sible, protected zone within which to work the patent.
Finally, it has been suggested that reintroducing equitable principles
into the patent system would directly benefit the Japanese. "Equity must
be considered because other Asian countries are catching up to Japan.
And, they are starting to do the same things to Japanese products [that
the U.S. claims is being done to it], i.e. filing very similar patents. 20 3
F. Pre-Grant Opposition
"The pre-grant opposition procedure is viewed as a mechanism
often used to tie-up the grant of a patent and undercut obtaining effective
and enforceable rights."2" By way of comparison, third-party actions to
invalidate a patent in the United States begin only after a patent has been
granted-and hence rights have been established and validity is
presumed. 20 5
The standard explanation for such a system, and not only in Japan,
is that "[o]ppositions (as well as citation of art by the public to laid-open
applications) tend to assure higher quality of the patents ultimately is-
sued."' 2 6 Oppositions tend to result in fewer patents being issued; and,
once issued, these patents tend to be upheld by the courts.2 07
In terms of costs, it has been opined that the Japanese could not
afford the post-grant litigation system that the United States employs.20 8
The reasoning is that once the patent has "survived" opposition and been
granted, it is very strong. Thus, people tend not to go to court over a
patent, believing in its validity, and hence avoid litigation expenses.2 9
On the other hand, critics point to a number of problems. The first
is that the process is subject to abuse; oppositions can be filed simply to
delay a grant,210 leaving the applicant with only provisional rights. This
203. Hattori, supra note 13.
204. AIPLA Letter, supra note 107, at 3.
205. A third party can seek declaratory judgment or assert an affirmative defense of patent
invalidity in the courts. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1992) (validity of granted patent presumed). Or the
party can seek a reexamination, a discretionary practice in which the USPTO will consider
newly-cited documentary evidence, read prior art. Id. § 302-7.
206. Daus, supra note 3, at 480; Views, supra note 5, at 1034 ("The purpose of the opposi-
tion system was to minimize the number of patents liable to be invalidated later, in other
words, to strengthen patents by participation of the public in the examination before granting
of the patent.").
207. Daus, supra note 3, at 480; Views, supra note 5, at 1034.
208. Hattori, supra note 13.
209. Id.
210. Dunphy, supra note 100, at 27 ("BP's director of the patent and license division,
Larry Evans, says his company observed a pattern of objections to the company's applications
in Japan that indicated rivals were cooperating to block the company's entry into the Japanese
market.").
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delay may result in the loss of the market or the obsolescence of the
disclosed technology.211 The problem is compounded when multiple op-
positions are filed. In those circumstances, there are no means by which
to consolidate oppositions, and each must be handled individually.21 In
comparison with a post-grant opposition system, it is not apparent that
pre-grant opposition is necessarily a cheaper or more effective practice.
To effectively utilize the opposition process, one must have the resources
to track publication in the KOKOKU KOHO constantly.213 There are
costs associated with filing the opposition, including the collection of evi-
dence and the writing of the opposition.2 4 Finally, from the applicant's
side, there are the costs of preparing a written reply to any and all oppo-
sitions, 215 and the applicant bears the risks of delay. In contrast, action
in the United States need not be brought until it is clear that the patent
will be (or has been) granted. Because the applicant is under a duty to
disclose all material prior art,2 16 it, rather than a patent holder whose
rights may be infringed, carries the greater up-front cost. Also, where a
third party opposes based on newly disclosed prior art, the discretionary
reexamination procedure, which is usually granted in those circum-
stances, 17 avoids litigation.
Quality of patents fares equally well under the post-grant opposition
system. In view of the severe consequences: striking the application,
treble damages in antitrust litigation, denial of reissue, nonenforceabil-
ity of patent, etc., the duty of candor and disclosure puts a heavy duty
on patent applicants. This is probably as strong a factor for high qual-
ity patents as are opposition procedures of other nations.
As with previously addressed criticisms, the real problem seems to
be not so much oppositions, per se, but the abuse of the opposition pro-
cess in a bad faith effort to delay granting a patent or to support patent
flooding. Therefore, perhaps the criticism is better directed at a lack of
means to adequately address, and redress, such abuses and misuse of the
process.
In the end, both patent offices have equally credible support for the
timing of opposition chosen for their respective systems. Therefore, it is
not possible to say one approach is more valid than the other. However,
211. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
212. Approved Minutes, supra note 53, at 7; see also Dunphy, supra note 100.
213. Here again is an element of the process that discriminates in favor of economically
larger companies, rather than the nationality of the company (except to the degree that it is
less costly for a Japanese company to monitor these publications).
214. Patent Law, supra note 1, at arts. 55, 56.
215. Id. art. 57.
216. See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1992) (oath to this effect, a breach of which is a fraud on the
Patent Office); 37 C.F.R. § 1.55(a) (1991) (requires duty of candor and good faith).
217. Daus, supra note 3, at 481.
218. Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
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to the extent oppositions are a problem, it appears that their use is de-
creasing. Along with a global decline in the use of opposition, the JPO
notes a "decline in percentage of oppositions filed from 13.4% to 8%,"
using 1985 figures, although "the average number of oppositions filed per
opposed application remained constant, 1.46-1.84 ....219
V
Deficiencies in Enforcement
Deficiencies in enforcement can be found at a number of levels, con-
cerning a number of issues. Rather than specific criticisms, these defi-
ciencies tend to be lumped together in a general dissatisfaction with
recourse to judicial action in the Japanese legal system. In fact, litigation
over patents is rare in Japan.220
Perhaps the biggest criticism is directed against the court process
and the limited availability of legal redress. Of course, the validity of this
criticism necessarily goes to the structure of the Japanese legal system as
a whole. Nevertheless, real limitations to using judicial methods of en-
forcement are evident-which, in fact, may well be purposely built into
the system.22'
The first major problems are time and cost. In Japan, it often takes
up to six years for a patent case to be resolved, requiring much activity
along the way. 22 2 "[T]he trial court rarely meets for your case-approxi-
mately once a month-and no discovery is permitted. Judicial proceed-
ings are slow, costly and generally available only after the infringer has
an opportunity to invalidate the patent in an exhaustive patent office in-
validation proceeding.
223
The second major problem arises with respect to trade secrets.
"There are no provisions for protective orders, so if a trade secret is in-
219. Id. at 481.
220. It has long been a belief that the Japanese are averse to litigation. Yasuhei Taniguchi,
Japanese legal scholar and Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford Univ., Presentation to the
Japanese Legal Systems class, Stanford Law School (Mar. 13, 1991). See, e.g., Takeyoshi
Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL OR-
DER IN CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (1963). However, another explanation is that the legal system
discourages litigation by limiting the number of legal practitioners and through high costs. See
John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978);
Taniguchi, supra. When it appears that Japanese companies actively seek to avoid litigation,
choosing instead, say, to negotiate, it is not simply an aversion to litigation, but very likely
involves barriers to access to the courts. However, there is also the historical development of
the Japanese legal system which stressed such alternative dispute resolution. Id. (Feb. 26 and
27, 1991).
221. See Daus, supra note 3; Taniguchi, supra note 220 (Mar. 13 and 20, 1991).
222. Silverman, supra note 98. In comparison, while the trial process in Europe is also
slow, it yields "actual judgments" that allow for some degree of predictability. Id.
223. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
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volved, the suit will expose it."' 224 This may operate as an insurmounta-
ble barrier, precluding litigation as an option.
Even if plaintiffs do litigate, they are not guaranteed a remedy. In-
junctive relief is almost nonexistent,225 and "no one has heard of" a pre-
liminary injunction being available. 226 And damages? Again, it is
questionable whether these will be awarded.227
The task of pursuing judicial redress is made even more difficult by
the absence of equitable doctrines for pioneer patents and infringement
by equivalents. Through narrow interpretations, and a preference for
narrow claims, there is much latitude for workings which are very, per-
haps even functionally, similar to the patented subject matter, but are
nevertheless deemed non-infringing.228
Finally, given the difficulty achieving redress under operation of full
patent rights, one can only surmise the added difficulty when the rights
are only conditional. For example, against an unauthorized working of
an invention that has been laid open, there is only a provisional right to
compensation.229 In addition, the provisional exclusive right that arises
upon publication for opposition presents the applicant with a dilemma.
First, the applicant incurs costs from prosecuting an unauthorized use,
without guarantee of redress. Second, should the application be aban-
doned, withdrawn or invalidated after so exercising the right, the appli-
cant must "indemnify any damage caused to another party by the
exercise of that right. 230
The validity of this criticism cannot be determined. This criticism
goes beyond the patent system, addressing the entire Japanese legal
structure, including built-in barriers to litigation. Nonetheless, nothing
weakens the credibility of the criticisms alleged. At least from the per-
spective of the U.S. litigant-and perhaps of anyone who finds a competi-
tor working a functionally equivalent invention or process in Japan-the
enforcement mechanisms fall short of fully, and adequately, supporting
the exclusive rights granted by a patent.
To the degree that this is so, it can help explain why critics have
been so vocal in other areas of the patent system. The basis of a patent
system is a trade-off of disclosure for exclusive rights. The less meaning-
224. Silverman, supra note 98.
225. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
226. Silverman, supra note 98.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
229. Views, supra note 5, at 1028.
230. Id. at 1031.
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ful the grant of rights, the more likely that applicants will resent disclo-
sure, and see themselves on the losing end of the bargain.231
VI
Issues Concerning Patents as Competitive Tools
This section addresses two main issues: patent flooding and cross-
licensing. The former is not an aspect of the system, per se, but is a
particular use of the system that is, by definition, abusive. The patent
system is directly criticized to the extent that it encourages and permits,
or at least takes no action against, this activity. The latter issue is not
addressed in terms of a criticism, but rather in terms of potential pitfalls
and suggested strategies. However, it, too, is criticized to the extent that
it appears to be the end goal of patent flooding.
A. Patent Flooding
Succinctly, patent flooding is "the filing of numerous applications by
Japanese companies for insignificant variations surrounding laid-open
applications ... which prevents the original inventor from working his
invention as reduced to practice without cross-licensing.', 232 The pur-
pose of "[t]his tactic of filing scores of unworthy patents surrounding the
core technology of another inventor" is to gain access to that core tech-
nology by forcing the cross-licensing agreement upon it.233 As suggested
by this description and previous material, this misuse requires the inter-
action of a number of aspects of the Japanese patent system. 234 Perhaps
more clearly than in any other area, the biggest risk factor for a potential
victim is small size.235 An example elaborates.236
1. The Example-Fusion Technology v. Mitsubishi
U.S.-based Fusion Technology entered the Japanese market in 1975
selling "high-intensity ultraviolet lamps powered by 500 to 6,000 watts of
microwave energy." Previous experimentation had been done only with
231. Of course, if one supports the goal of sharing information with industry, one will be
less resentful of disclosure, despite the grant of limited rights. However, this might change if
more foreign applicants start to use the same system to the ultimate disadvantage of domestic
industry. See supra text accompanying note 203.
232. Sekine & Kakinuki, supra note 12, at 237-38.
233. Spero, supra note 67, at 60.
234. "We have patents filed and issued around the world, including the United States,
Japan, and Europe. But only in Japan have we experienced the kind of targeting and piracy
that [is involved in the Fusion Technology example]." Id.
235. Silverman, supra note 98.
236. See generally Spero, supra note 67. See also Dunphy, supra note 100; Ogihara, supra
note 142; Bruce Stokes, The Culture of Patents, 20 NAT'L J. 1350 (1988).
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low power of one to five watts.237 Fusion Technology had received pat-
ents on their inventions despite formal opposition by Mitsubishi.23 Fu-
sion says their product was targeted by Mitsubishi: in 1977, Mitsubishi
bought one of their lamps, had an engineering team reverse-engineer it,
and then began to flood the JPO with applications.239
Given their small size, and inexperience with the system,2" Fusion
did not monitor patent filings at that time. They did not realize that by
the end of 1977, Mitsubishi "had filed the first of nearly 300 patent appli-
cations copying and surrounding [Fusion's] high-intensity microwave-
lamp technology.1 241 It was not until 1983 that the company realized
what was happening. As the president and CEO of Fusion reads it:
"Mitsubishi could reasonably expect that a company as small as Fusion
would be so anxious to acquire a license to Mitsubishi's Japanese patents
that we would willingly exchange a license to our own core technology.
It was wrong. "242 Fusion felt that the Mitsubishi applications fell into
three categories: the first copied elements directly from the Fusion lamp
system; the second contained filings of materials already in the public
domain; and the third contained "sashimi patents" that were only thinly
different from Fusion's patented technology.243 The company was aware
that "[tjracking and opposing hundreds of these Japanese filings pose[d]
a significant burden."12 " However, if they issued, Fusion would not be
able to sell its lamp.
A main Mitsubishi defense-other than saying the JPO would de-
cide-is that Fusion used a "line light source" (tubular in shape) and
that its [Mitsubishi's] lamp is a "point light source" (spherical in
shape) .... However, Fusion's invention and basic patents did not
depend on the shape of the bulb; but rather on the method of generat-
ing high-intensity ultraviolet light. Although Mitsubishi asserts that
237. Spero, supra note 67, at 59.
238. Id. at 60.
239. Id. Mitsubishi admits buying and examining the lamp, stating that doing such is a
common corporate patent tactic, but said the JPO would decide if they copied the technology.
Ogihara, supra note 142, at 6. As might be expected, U.S. interests doubt the ability of the
JPO to be objective "in international disputes because of close tie[s] between Japan's govern-
ment and private sector." Id.
240. For example, Fusion, like many other U.S. companies, simply sent their patents to
Japan to be translated and filed by a clerk. Spero, supra note 67, at 60.
241. Id.
242. Id. This quote highlights the importance of size and bargaining power. Clearly,
smaller companies are more likely to be victims.
It is interesting that, in discussions between Mitsubishi and Fusion, "one Mitsubishi exec-
utive pounded his fist and said, 'Mr. Spero, it's not rightl You have a dominant market share
in Japan. It's not fair. We're a small company too.' 'That's ridiculous,' [Fusion's president
and CEO] said. 'You're a $20 billion company.' 'In the lamp business we're small,' he re-
plied." Spero, supra note 67, at 67.
243. Id. at 60-62.
244. Id. at 62.
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the shape of its lamp is a critical distinction, a great many of its filings
affect eually all high-intensity microwave lamps-regardless of shape
During this dispute, Mitsubishi had been pushing for a cross-licens-
ing agreement that would have given it undisputed access to Fusion's
technology. For example, Fusion first suggested an agreement whereby
Fusion would not oppose the filings, and Mitsubishi would not assert
them, once awarded, against Fusion. After six months of negotiations, in
the words of Fusion's CEO, "Mitsubishi hit us with the coercive cross-
licensing demand: Fusion would pay Mitsubishi a royalty for the privi-
lege of using 'its' patents in Japan. Mitsubishi would get a royalty-free,
worldwide cross license to all Fusion's technology. ' 246 As the issue be-
came more political247 and new deals were suggested, the cross-licensing
aspect remained. Not until January 1989 was that aspect dropped, only
to be replaced with a demand for "a 3% running royalty on all [Fusion's]
sales in Japan-in effect, a tax on [Fusion's] business. '2 4' Fusion contin-
ues to oppose the filings. So far, three patents have issued to Mitsubishi,
which has threatened, but failed, to take action.249
2. Systemic Support
Most aspects of patent flooding have been criticized individually.
These include delays in granting rights, laying open applications, claims
limitations, pre-grant oppositions, and weak enforcement. 25' As should
now seem obvious, these aspects combine to give competitors access to
technology before the applicant has exclusive rights, as well as the
chance for the patent to be delayed through oppositions-perhaps pre-
emptorily. They require potential victims to follow filings to ensure they
are not being flooded and to permit and uphold patents for technology
that differs minimally, even inconsequentially, from that of a competitor.
An additional charge is that the lax requirements of the JPO with
relation to disclosing prior art facilitate patent flooding.25
"[T]heoretically Japan has no American-type doctrine of 'patent fraud',"
relying more on oppositions than the duty of candor to prevent examin-
ers being misled.252 Although there is a requirement of disclosure, there
is no penalty for failure to do so. 253 Therefore, for a company intent on
245. Id.
246. Id. at 64.
247. See generally id.; Dunphy, supra note 100; Ogihara, supra note 142.
248. Spero, supra note 67, at 67.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 121-27, 169.74, 177-219, and accompanying text.
251. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
252. Daus, supra note 3, at 481.
253. See Ogihara, supra note 142.
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flooding, there is little incentive to disclose the patents of targeted
technology.
It is hard to argue with the validity of these charges. This practice
goes beyond patenting "related" technology, allowing the purposeful
forcing of a patent holder to concede technology or revenues. It cannot
simply be that the Japanese are more competitive than those utilizing the
EPO, because this practice is not reported in the American patent sys-
tems, either.254 Basically, it defeats the purpose of the patent system, at
least from the point of view of a non-Japanese company.2 " Why allow
such basically contradictory practices? Because even patented core tech-
nology can be blocked from its claimed use-specifically what the patent
system said the applicant had the exclusive right to do when the patent
issued-because of a later-issuing patent.256 And perhaps that is at the
crux of the matter-it seems to defy logic that "second-comer" patents
can issue that are close enough to a "first" patent to prevent its claimed
use, but not close enough to infringe that claim.
Unfortunately, flooding seems to favor the goals of supporting Japa-
nese industry, as long as it is not practiced against large, Japanese com-
panies (this may be an impossibility given their bargaining power). 257
First, flooding favors large companies which have the resources neces-
sary to track filings, reverse engineer, and coerce a cross-license.258 Sec-
ond, flooding allows Japanese industry to acquire new, even basic,
technologies and foreign revenues, through licensing fees, without incur-
ring research and development costs. Third, once a Japanese competitor
can directly compete with a foreign company within the Japanese mar-
ket, the former is likely to end up on top.2 59
All told, "[s]o common is [cross-licensing an] outcome that former
U.S. Patent Commissioner Donald J. Quigg has said, '[The Japanese] in-
directly have a massive mandatory licensing system.' ",260
254. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
256. See generally Brown, supra note 118.
257. If flooding is practiced against any foreign applicant, or even a small Japanese appli-
cant, Japanese industry as a whole benefits because large corporations with adequate resources
can acquire the technology, exploit it, and begin the innovation process anew. It is more likely
that large foreign corporations will not be targets, given equal bargaining power-if not within
the United States, then in other markets important to Japanese industry.
258. See supra text accompanying note 244; see also supra note 213.
259. See infra text accompanying note 265.
260. Spero, supra note 67, at 66.
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B. Cross-Licensing
The discussion of patent flooding illustrates how cross-licensing can
be employed coercively. "Using the patent system to extract technolo-
gies from true innovators typically has a good payoff. Most targeted
companies, whether Japanese or foreign, see no choice but to cross-li-
cense, giving the predator the right to practice the misappropriated
invention." 261
However, there are valid reasons to seek a cross-license agreement.
In wanting both to give and receive licenses, Japanese companies "want
to feel comfortable that they won't face someone popping up at some
time after doing business to say they're infringing. 26 2 And, as a matter
of course, cross-licensing is a common, even preferred, way for Japanese
competitors to deal with patents.263
Thus, U.S. holders of Japanese patents must plan their licensing
strategy carefully. Indiscriminate licensing can be short-sighted and
costly; those to whom you license can eventually come back and try to
recoup their licensing fees by licensing their technology to you.26" Tech-
nology which is truly proprietary should not be licensed. As one execu-
tive has stated: "Don't license [to] your competitor in Japan unless you
plan to exit the Japanese market. The record shows that most U.S. com-
panies do not fare well in the Japanese market once they are in direct
competition with Japanese suppliers selling equivalent products. ' 265
However, for technology which is not so critical to your business, cross-
licensing can be beneficial, especially where you can tap into needed re-
search and development of other firms.266
VII
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the cultural differences between the U.S.
and Japanese patent systems are a crucial factor in the majority of criti-
cisms. However, they are by no means the only, or necessarily determi-
native, factors. In fact, a number of aspects of the Japanese system are
shared with other national patent practices, or are a necessity whether or
not shared. With respect to these aspects, some of the criticisms appear
more self-serving than constructive. Also, several of the most critical
complaints do not address aspects of the Japanese patent system, but
261. Id.
262. Silverman, supra note 98.
263. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
264. Silverman, supra note 98.
265. Spero, supra note 67, at 65.
266. Silverman, supra note 98.
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rather how companies have learned to use it to inequitable and abusive
ends. However, there are indeed notable weaknesses within the Japanese
patent practice that are validly criticized by the United States.
This article has reached a number of conclusions about specific criti-
cisms. First is cost. The biggest cost of the practice is not systemic;
rather, it has come from the failure of U.S. applicants to appreciate the
complexity of the Japanese language and the need for careful, timely
translations. Second is time delay and examiner overload. This is clearly
a problem that has arisen through several factors. The JPO has recog-
nized this, and has taken comprehensive measures to bring the applica-
tion pendency, once examination is requested, closer to EPO and USPTO
practices. As for the request system, it cannot fairly be called a systemic
problem. Rather, it is more an issue of smaller companies learning to
effectively utilize this procedure more than the practice followed by the
USPTO.
Next is the laying open system. This goes to the heart of the cul-
tural differences between our two systems, promoting industrial sharing
as opposed to individual protection and confidentiality. One is therefore
hard pressed to determine legitimately whether this process is really a
problem for foreign applicants. What does seem apparent is that
problems charged against the KOKAI TOKKYO KOHO stem more
from the misuse of the disclosed information in conjunction with other
parts of the system than from the disclosure itself.
Fourth is claim limitations and interpretation. There are cultural
aims in approaching claims in this way. Nevertheless, the United States
has valid criticisms. The lack of equity in not protecting the patentee
against functional equivalents or allowing broader rights for pioneer pat-
ents is detrimental to fundamental goals of granting the patentee some
degree of workable exclusive rights. In addition, this failure is the pri-
mary force behind patent flooding.
Fifth, with respect to the pre-grant opposition, this approach ap-
pears neither better nor worse than the USPTO approach. Therefore, it
would appear little more than ethnocentric to request that only U.S.-
style, post-grant oppositions be allowed, especially in light of the global
decrease in pre-grant oppositions.
The sixth conclusion concerns the deficiencies in enforcement mech-
anisms. To a large degree, the criticisms in this area necessarily address
the Japanese legal system as a whole. Issues such as general access to
courts and lack of discovery clearly encompass more than the patent
realm. Determining the validity of these criticisms, if even possible, is
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the lack of redress and
judicial remedies, as applies to patents, can be considered a real, pressing
1992]
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problem. Unfortunately, solutions likely lie beyond the patent system
itself.
Finally, with respect to the use of patents as a competitive tool, sim-
ple cross-licensing is an excellent way to extract value from patents. This
calls for careful planning by the U.S. concern. However, there is the
misuse of the system known as patent flooding. This is an abuse, pure
and simple. Abusing their size, the weaknesses within the system, and
the cultural imperative of industrial advancement, certain large compa-
nies are able to extort technologies from smaller companies. Such activ-
ity is clearly and absolutely diametrically opposed to the patent system.
No matter how narrowly claims are interpreted in a particular system,
patent flooding allows a later applicant to block any working of patented
technology-even those uses claimed and granted in the original
application.
